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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------
1:1 JI.KL) J. WACKER, 
vs. 
Plaintif-f-
H.espondent, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 19008 
Civil No. 6733 
S!\MUEL J. 1-:1<.CFER, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATCMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
'nis is defendant's appeal from the court's findings 
that p:0'11L1lf >:as not residing with a person of the opposite 
ser,, pro·Jici<Cd for under Section 30-3-5 (3), Utah Code 
Annolc.Ler., as amended, and from the order of the court 
denying uefendant's motion to terminate alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant filed his affidavit in support of an Order 
to Stii:Jw Cause, upon which the court entered its order 
regu1r1 ng the plaintiff to show cause why the alimony awarded 
to rla1nl1ff under a Decree of Divorce should not be 
'"' 1 <•<1 •··aterl because plaintiff was residing with a person of the 
Lt t' .sex. The hearing was held on January 10, 1983, 
wher<'upon the court stated that this case fell outside the 
meaning of Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated, I"' 
amended, and extended its order denying defendant's clain, 
alimony should be terminated. 
defendant appeals. 
From this Order and Juuyn,. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the order of the lower coc 
reversed and requests an order terminating alimony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A divorce action was heard by the trial court 
Sc;-t.cmber 25, 1978, with Findings of Fact, Conclusions of c 
er,-, Decree of Divorce being entered by the court on Octot 
l ' (R. pg 15) • After the divorce was grante 
;2jrtiff left Roosevelt, Utah and eventually came to res: 
,c.lEs, Arizona (TR54) During her residence in Noyale 
(TE 
rc...:._2tions 
has lived with Dennis Warr intermittently for tr,r 
4 9) In July of 1979, 
Mr. Warr (TR 59), and 
plaintiff had 
as a result of Si 
t<lctions with plaintiff, Mr. Warr contracted a veneu 
Herpes Simplex 2 (TR 60). Plaintiff and Mt. 
sur,sequently shared the same bedroom on occasion (TR 481 
I',r. \•;arr kept his clothing and personal effects at 1 
plaintiff's residence (TR 50) Mr. Warr and the plaint 
sl1are the rent, utility and grocery bills (TR 51) · 
Fn_,ruary 1982 to September 1982, Samra Lee Wacker, daughter 
plaintiff and defendant, resided with plaintiff and Mr. Wart 
-2-
rn1 d r.ee testified that Mr. Warr maintained no other 
l<>11ce during the seven month period that she resided with 
tiw 1•laintiff (TR 50). Defendant learned of plaintiff's 
,.,,,,Juct ano filed his-motion for termination of alimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER TERMINATING 
ALTMONY REQUIRED TO BE PAID TO PLAINTIFF BY REASON OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 30-3-5(3), 
UTAH CUDL ANNOTATE[> 1953, AS AMENDED. 
Defendant maintains that the undisputed facts before 
the court show that plaintiff was residing with a person of 
the or po site sex '1 nd had admitted sexual conduct with that 
person. 
In filinQ his motion for termination of alimony, 
defenudnt relied upc;n the following statute: 
( 3) Any order of the court that a party 
pay alimony to a former spouse shall be 
terminated U'JOn application of that party 
establishing - that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex, 
unless it is further established by the 
person receiving alimony that the 
relationship or association between them is 
without any sexual contact. 
lilah Code AnnotatE:d 30-3-5 (3) (1953) (as amended 1979). The 
'""' ·i 1 nq of this section of the statute imp.lJes a mandatory 
1•'11·1 n21tion of alimony upon establishing that the former 
0pc•u:oF is residing with a person of the opposite sex and has 
-3-
had sexual contact with that person. In this case, r, 
plaintiff testified that she has had sexual contact WI ii 
Warr (TR 59) in July of 1979 and plaintiff's ddil'!' 
testified that during the period from February 
September, 1982, the plaintiff and Mr. Warr shared the sa· 
bedroom on occasion. (TR 48). Mr. Warr and the plaintifl 
been living together for approximately three years (TR 
end f•ir. \\arr kept his clothing and personal effects at t,, 
r2sicJEw;e of plaintiff and had no other residence (TR IC. 
c;:-1:ose conditions occurred while the defendant was under 
,,rC:cr of the court to support the plaintiff oy the payment c 
All of the provisions of Section 30-3-5 (3) have bee 
r .. c'c 2nd relief from the payment of alimony should be granted. 
Prior to the 1979 amendment of Section 3CJ-3-I 
could be terminated only upon the remarriage of n• 
'Lceiving alimony. In enacting Section 30-3-5(3),. 
le()i,,lc;ture gave recognition to changes in lifestyle that to• .. 
plc.ce during the 1960's and 70's and allowed the courts t: 
tcke into consideration the effect of cohabitation by 
e):-2pouse with a member of the opposite sex for purposes c 
terr.,inating alimony payments. Through Section 30-3-5(3) tr. 
legislature sought: 11 To create an additional excuse 
relief from alimony. There are some instances that 
,, 
particularly gall mg. When the former spouse tar.e
0 
housekeeping with another man, it is not equitable for tt1e 
-4-
t v c r husband to have to continue support." (43rd 
cJcilure, Feb. 26, 1979, Third Reading of Bill in House). 
The lower court held that the plaintiff did not 
with Mr. War:r within the definition of Section 
JU--l-5(3). 
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 2nd 
defines the word "reside" as: 
"To dwell permanently or for 
time; to have a settled abode 
to abide; to live in or at." 
a length of 
for a time; 
It is clar from the facts of this case that Mr. Warr did 
reside the plaintiff. The living situation between 
plaintift Mr. Warr has continued for over three years and 
is not merely a temporary arrangement. 
kecently, the Utah Supreme Court examined Section 
30-3-'.(3) ir1 Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980). 
The COLH l in Knuteson held that the divorced wife was not a 
"resident" ir1 the male neighbor's home within the meaning of 
statute. 
Mrs. Wacker' s situation can easily be distinguished 
from the Knuteson case. In Knuteson, the plaintiff (Mr. Ray 
Knlltesunl was considerably in arrears in his payment of 
al j mony Tt1erefore, the defendant (Mrs. Knuteson) could not 
afford payment of gas and electrial bills and consequently 
utilities were shut off, forcing the defendant and her 
1,, l·!ren to move out. The family accepted an offer to live at 
-5-
the residence of a male neighbor, Mr. Gary l'onclor. Jlutin: 
two months that defendant resided at the neiyhbor'c; 1,,,,. 
defendant spent most of the daytime hours at hPr [ f--' 1 J· 
attending to household chores, such a cleaning, ya rel 
etc. Although the defendant did engage in sexual contact w,· 
Mr. Condor, it was clear to the court triat she never inten0, 
to abandon her home or reside with a person of the Df-'}:os: 
sex. As soon as the defendG>nt received funds fro;n 
plaintiff, she returne6 tn her own residence. 
The situation in tr.is case bears little resen,L,,-. 
to the Knuteson case. Mrs. Wacker has lived 1-:ith a men,bu 
the opposite sex for approximately tr,ree years and duririy 
time, defendant has continued his support by payment 
The living situation in Knuteson 
frc 1 rt1 an emergency s l tuation caused by ttic a.:Jts 
The court in Knuteson held that the stato:-
(Section 30-3-5 ( 3)) did not apply to an inciescretion wh1cr"' 
the result of a temporary emeryency situation occasionec' 
unlivable conditions caused t,y the ex-husband. Clearly t[,_ 
is not the situation in this case. Mrs. Wacker chose 
reside with a memoer of the opposite sex, not as a matter 
emergency or necess1 ty, but rather one of convenience 
personal preference. The action of Mrs. Wacker is not 11,et 1·' 
a single inc1de!lt of sexual misconduct but rather a scrl'-
instances which gave her new partner (Mr. \·Jarr) the t>uieflt 
-6-
"'", J aJe relationship without the legality. The purpose of 
"lot ute as stated in Knuteson is 11 to prevent 
1onable servitude to an undeserving divorced spouse." 
1 rl ,., I J JC! Y. The situation in Wacker v. Wacker, clearly is one 
tr• wllirh the statute should apply. 
The state of Illinois has enacted a statute which 
cl<>eoel/ resembles the Utah statute: 
_I l l. 
"llnless otherwise agreed by the parties in 
viritten separation agreement the 
to pay future maintenance is 
t<cr;, in2ted upon the death of either party, 
c•r lr1• rerr.arriage of the party receiving 
intcc1i',nce, or if the party receiving 
cohabits with another person on 
continuing conjugal basis." 
t c.. l. 1977, ch. 40, par. 510 (b) (Emphasis 
Tt1<:c Illinois court had occasion to examine this 
,td:itc ir. ti,,: CcS<C of In Re Support of Halford, Ill. App. 3d 
61; y I _i H h • 1: . .:o 1131. The facts of Halford are very similar 
L11 011 oppecl. In Halford, the ex-husband filed a motion 
tc terrr.n1c_te r1is c.limony payment to his ex-wife because of the 
ex-•1fe's clleged cohabitation with another man. The evidence 
ir, tlaltorcl showed that Mrs. Halford had another man (Wayne 
·11 er,> J n·in(J in her home for over three years. Mrs. Halford 
tP•,,t it iul t hot she has had sexual intercourse with this man 
n1ir>E "' tour times since he has lived with her. In other 
111J1•1,/, bruce Matthews, an ex-son-in-law of Mrs. Green, 
"1r tr121t he had seen Mrs. Halford and Mr. Green occupy 
t•edroom. This situation clearly parallels the 
-7-
The court in Halford held that the cevidenc;-· 1 , 
established that the ex-wife's conJugal relationshq. "'"-'' 
resident continuous basis, and thus Mr. Halford's ':Otdi•,1c. 
to pay future maintenance was terminated. The court stnte_ 
"Where the courle must also be cohab1 tating on a resident ,-
continuing basis, proof of occurrence of sexual lf1terc•.,r 
over time peri.c.d rather than proof of its frequency 15 
primary importance." Id at 1132. 1 l1e intent of the lllrnc.,, 
legislature Y..'d.S to provide iur the termincilion ol 
spouse receiving the maintenance r1c.s entered into 
relationship "lith anotr1er t;y legc l or other meanc-. L 
1134. The Utan legislature nc,d a si:r,ilar intent 1d1e11 e11a,·1 
the Utah statu'ce that closel2· resen,tdes the Illinois cti1tutc. 
The Ct ail court riot been confronted 1 .. 1tt, 
situation like thic c:ose. Th E ref ore , the co u rt 1,' 2 r' i:. 
rely on the Hc,lforc' Ccise s.cr1ce the facts closely resen,ole ti. 
case and the Illinois statute pari.illels the Utah statute ,, 
was enacted for the same purposE. Under the Haliord decis1 
Mr. Wacker i:o entitled to a termination of 
payments because Mrs. Wacker has clearly acted in the ma""' 
contemplated under the statute. 
CUlLLUSIUh 
Based upon the facts before the court, (J t t l I 
respectfully submits that provisions of Utah Code Annotolt"' 
-8-
Lion 30-3-5(3) are applicable, and that the conduct 
µlaintiff was exactly that contemplated by the 
L· y 1 1 at ure in enacting that provision. Thus, the trial court 
CL"nn1ittPd error inf.ailing to grant defendant's motion for 
rern'111dtion of alimony. This court should therefore reverse 
the trial court and enter an order terminating the provisions 
ct tne Decree of Divorce requiring defendant to pay to 
µlaintiff alimony in the sum of $500.00 per month. 
DATEQ this 15th day of April, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McRAE & DeLAUD 
ROEER ·M. McRAE 
Attorney for Appellant 
1680 West Highway 40, #1190 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
1•1!\ILED OR HAD DELIVEFtED two copies of the foregoing 
i'ppel lant's Brief this lfth d;:,y of April, 1983, to John C. 
Beaslin, Attorney for Respondent, 185 North Vernal Avenue, 
'1ernal, Utah 84078. 
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